Indonesia’s presidential election heats up with first debate

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Jakarta: It was billed as the great debate on law, corruption, terrorism and human rights.

The first presidential debate of the Indonesian political season was a chance for Indonesian President Joko Widodo and his challenger, Prabowo Subianto, to square up in prime time ahead of the April 17 poll, with their respective vice-presidential running mates by their side.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma'ruf Amin during the televised debate in Jakarta on Thursday night.

Indonesian President Joko Widodo and his running mate Ma’ruf Amin during the televised debate in Jakarta on Thursday night.Credit:AP

The President and the challenger. A re-run of the hard-fought 2014 election, when the two men faced each other for the first time and Widodo came out on top.

But while in 2019 the candidates are the same, this poll is no re-run of the previous election.

Widodo – a relative political clean skin five years ago who cut his teeth as governor of Jakarta and mayor of the mid-sized city of Solo – now has both the benefit and the burden of five years’ incumbency.

A banner in Jakarta for Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto.

A banner in Jakarta for Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto.Credit:AP

He has made progress as president, investing heavily in infrastructure, health and education, but in a country where corruption is near-endemic and poverty – despite a growing middle class – is still rife, it has not been progress enough.

Prabowo, the failed candidate from 2014 who also lost out when vice-presidential candidate in 2009, this poll is probably his last chance to win the presidency.

Both men have it all to play for.

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Not that you would know it on the evidence of the first debate, with both men and their would-be deputies looking robotic and giving risk-averse answers seemingly designed to bore their opponents into submission.

The problem with the debate started with the fact that both sides had all the moderators’ questions a week beforehand, though the full slate of quesitons was not asked.

Indonesia’s election commission argued that this would allow the candidates to give substantive answers and better inform voters.

Instead, it sucked much of the life out of the debate – especially compared to the free-flowing 2014 presidential contest – as Widodo, his deputy Ma’ruf Amin, Prabowo and his deputy Sandiaga Uno delivered rehearsed answers, and did so poorly.

Both sides danced around each other for close to two-and-a-half hours (indeed, Amin took nearly an hour before he spoke to answer a question) and the voters, for the most part, would be not much wiser.

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Sandiaga Uno during the debate.

Indonesian presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Sandiaga Uno during the debate.Credit:AP

Widodo began optimistically, promising more progress in delivering education, health and further land reform if given another five years. But the Obama-like candidate of 2014, who promised hope and change, is now a known quantity.

Prabowo, who projects the image of a strongman that befits his years in the Indonesian military, promised stronger legal institutions, better salaries for public servants to reduce corruption and to ensure all Indonesians benefited from the country’s vast natural resources wealth.

That last proposal was rejected by the President, who said public servants’ salaries were sufficient, but that incentive payments were available for those who earned them.

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But both men gave few details about how they would ensure that human rights were not sacrificed by law enforcement agencies fighting terrorism; both said the the right thing about showing respect for Indonesia’s religious and ethnic minority groups, and for the disabled; and both vowed to tackle the maze of overlapping national and local legal regulations that can make it so difficult to do business in Indonesia, though again with few details.

One of the few answers from Amin, a senior Muslim cleric, on how to fight terrorism was one of the most (relatively) incisive of the night.

Terrorism is not jihad, he said, and it is haram [forbidden]. If the root cause of terrorism was a person’s misunderstanding of his or her religion, Amin said, then they needed to be re-educated. But if the root cause was the economy, then the government’s approach should be focused on providing jobs.

Uno, who made several solid contributions – and who at times seemed to be auditioning to be a presidential candidate in 2024, when Widodo (if he wins this time) cannot run again for a third time – stressed the need to provide economic opportunity to tackle terrorism and corruption.

In the final stages, when the candidates asked each other questions they had not been forewarned about, the debate came to life a little, with Widodo putting Prabowo on the back foot when he asked first about why his party had so few women involved, and then later why – if Prabowo was so committed to tackling corruption – he had so many candidates who had been convicted of corruption in the past.

On balance the President won the debate as he was able, more often, to provide more detailed policy responses – though he was at times too technocratic.

The debate ended with no new big ideas advanced and little light shed on either candidate’s policies.

Perhaps fittingly, neither man could even manage the inspiration to say something positive about the other when invited to do so at the end of the night.

James Massola is south-east Asia correspondent, based in Jakarta. He was previously chief political correspondent for The Sydney Morning Herald and The Age, based in Canberra. He has been a Walkley and Quills finalist on three occasions.

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Indonesian Presidential Candidates Debate Corruption, Terrorism

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Indonesian Presidential Candidates Debate Corruption, Terrorism

(Bloomberg) — Indonesian President Joko Widodo pledged to intensify the fight against corruption through merit-based political appointments in the first presidential debate as his challenger Prabowo Subianto mooted higher pay for bureaucrats to tackle the menace seen as hindering the country’s development.

Seeking to win over swing voters, Widodo, known as Jokowi, defended his track record on corruption, terrorism, law reform and human rights in Thursday’s presidential debate, while Prabowo pitched for a decisive administration to tackle corruption and threats from home-grown and foreign terror groups.

Although the economy has taken the center-stage in the election campaign, sporadic terrorist attacks and allegations of human rights violations from Papua to Aceh have marked Jokowi’s tenure, allowing his challenger to project himself as a strongman capable of tackling these issues more effectively.

Jokowi’s approval rating is at 53.2 percent, compared with 34.1 percent for Prabowo, according to a survey by Charta Politika released on Wednesday. The incumbent, a former furniture businessman and the first non-elite to occupy the presidential office, led his rival by 20 points in a December survey by Indikator Politik Indonesia. It also found the gap between Widodo and Prabowo has closed by five points since September.

Catching Up

Prabowo can catch up with Jokowi if he woos the undecided and swing voters and the presidential debates may offer an opportunity to do that, according to Yunarto Wijaya, executive director of Charta Politika.

The candidates must create new momentum, Wijaya said. “If the public’s narration and conversation related to the presidential election is flat like now, Jokowi will maintain the rhythm and Prabowo will lose.”

Prabowo blamed low salaries of government officials, including judges and police as the root cause for rampant corruption in a country that Transparency International ranks alongside Colombia and Zambia as the 96th most corrupt among 176 nations.

“We must be able to ensure the quality of life of all officials that have the authority to make a decision so that they can’t be bribed,” Prabowo said. “With clean and strong institutions, we will be able to uphold the law.”

Prabowo has picked as his running mate Sandiaga Uno, a business-savvy former private equity investor. He blames the high public debt and slump in the currency to levels not seen since the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis as examples of Jokowi’s mismanagement of the economy. The former general is proposing to revitalize Southeast Asia’s largest economy by slashing taxes on companies and individuals if elected.

He’s also calling for a review of Indonesia’s economic relations with China, the nation’s largest trading partner. With the country posting a record trade deficit last year, Prabowo plans to “seek a better deal” with China and will push for bilateral talks, according to Irawan Ronodipuro, director of foreign affairs for the Prabowo campaign.

Infrastructure Focus

Jokowi, who has mostly limited his campaigning so far to inaugurating toll roads and airports, is seeking a mandate to carry on his agenda of better connecting the country’s scattered islands and transforming Indonesia from a commodity-reliant economy into a manufacturing power. His government has spent billions of dollars dollars to add roads, ports, dams and airports and created millions of new jobs.

Jokowi, who is supported by nine political parties, picked conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate, partly to fend off attacks from conservative groups, which accuse him of not doing enough to protect the interests of Muslims.

In contrast Prabowo is backed by hardline groups which were behind large public protest against former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, known as Ahok, who was later jailed after being found guilty of blasphemy.

They’ve already rallied behind Prabowo and their enthusiasm may help him build the momentum in the final months, according to Alexander R. Arifianto, a research fellow at S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore.

“Prabowo does have a large number of strong hard-core followers at grassroots level who are quite determined to help him score an upset against Jokowi,” Arifianto wrote in an email. “I believe it is premature to write off Prabowo at this point, despite Jokowi’s double-digit lead.”

To contact the reporters on this story: Arys Aditya in Jakarta at aaditya5@bloomberg.net;Viriya Singgih in Jakarta at vsinggih@bloomberg.net;Tassia Sipahutar in Jakarta at ssipahutar@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Ruth Pollard at rpollard2@bloomberg.net, Thomas Kutty Abraham

bloomberg.com</a>” data-reactid=”63″ type=”text”>For more articles like this, please visit us at bloomberg.com

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Jokowi’s vice-presidential turmoil | The Strategist

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The expression on Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s face as he fronted the media late on 9 August said it all: looking uncomfortable and cheerless, he announced flatly that the nation’s most prominent religious scholar, Ma’ruf Amin, would be his running mate for the April 2019 presidential election.

A short distance from the press conference, a dismayed Mahfud MD, a law professor and former chief justice of the Constitutional Court, who had been, until a few hours before, Widodo’s choice for vice-presidential candidate, was removing the bright-coloured ‘Jokowi’ T-shirt that the palace had asked him to don for what it confidently expected to be his nomination that afternoon.

Ensuing media reporting and commentary were full of accounts of how coalition parties had forced the president to abandon Mahfud at the last moment in favour of Ma’ruf. What should have been a display of political ascendency by an incumbent far ahead in the polls ended up being a humiliating backdown.

To make matters worse, the next day, his presidential rival, Prabowo Subianto, announced Jakarta deputy governor Sandiaga Uno as his running mate. Unlike Jokowi, Prabowo had stared down his coalition partners and appointed his preferred candidate from within his own party. In contrast to Jokowi’s vacillation and weakness, Prabowo appeared assured and in control.

How did Jokowi find himself in this position and what does it tell us about his political skills? To begin with, Jokowi, unlike his predecessor Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and Prabowo, doesn’t have his own party. He is a member of Megawati Sukarnoputri’s PDI-P, the largest party at the last election, but it is Megawati rather than him who directs the party and she has often been at loggerheads with the president on senior political appointments and policy issues. In 2014, PDI-P insisted that Jokowi accept Jusuf Kalla as his running mate, against his objections—a development that led to a similar stony-faced announcement that year. Jokowi’s attempts in recent years to use his presidential status to increase his influence over the party have yielded little.

In addition, Jokowi relies on a broad coalition of six parties, including PDI-P, to ensure his healthy parliamentary majority. He has distributed cabinet seats and plum bureaucratic and state-owned enterprise positions to coalition party cadre and benefactors to lock in their support. But as the election has approached, Jokowi has come under growing pressure from several of these parties to choose a vice-presidential candidate from among their ranks. Leading coalition candidates included Golkar chairman Airlangga Hartarto and PKB chairman Muhaimin Iskandar. PKB even threatened to split from the coalition if its candidate wasn’t chosen. So not only did Jokowi lack his own dedicated political vehicle, he also had to contend with demands from increasingly fractious coalition partners.

A third factor was Jokowi’s growing sense of vulnerability to attacks from Islamist groups. In the 2014 presidential election, black campaigns accused him of being a foreign-born non-Muslim and tool of anti-Islamic interests, which dented his popularity and contributed to a much closer than expected election outcome. And in 2016–17, his political ally, the Christian Chinese governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnomo (Ahok), was vanquished after massive protests from Islamic groups during the gubernatorial election. Jokowi fears a repetition of these attacks against him next year.

Despite all of these political pressures, Jokowi had resolved by early August 2018 to select Mahfud. Mahfud was unaligned to any party, had the highest popularity of any of the vice-presidential candidates and was broadly respected across society for his role as a jurist and commentator on legal affairs. If Mahfud had been elected, Jokowi could have relied upon him to make a major contribution to government and to have behaved in a statesman-like manner. He also felt Mahfud had sufficient appeal in the Muslim community to buttress the president’s religious standing.

But nominating Mahfud was a political gamble for Jokowi and one on which he miscalculated. He badly underestimated the resistance of his coalition parties to Mahfud. All parties opposed having a non-party vice-president who might use the position to run for the presidency in 2024, thereby interfering with their plans to nominate their own candidates for that election.

Many of his coalition partners, particularly Golkar and PKB, were also furious at his failure to clearly signal his intentions to them. Airlangga, for example, had been convinced until 9 August that he was Jokowi’s choice. In this regard, Jokowi’s deep aversion to confrontation, and his hope that he could make Mahfud’s nomination a fait accompli by leaving the announcement to the last moment, backfired.

When confronted by angry party chairmen on the afternoon of 9 August, Jokowi panicked and hastily reversed his decision on Mahfud. He was especially alarmed by warnings that the Islamic party PKB, and its main constituent, the 45-million-member Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) organisation, would withdraw their support for him. That would have imperilled millions of votes in the populous provinces of East and Central Java and left him more exposed to conservative Muslim criticism.

When Muhaimin proposed the name of NU president Ma’ruf Amin as an alternative to Mahfud, Jokowi quickly acceded. Ma’ruf is a conservative Islamic figure with a record of divisive stances on sensitive religious and social issues, but at 76 years of age, he’s unlikely to run in 2024. While Ma’ruf has low popularity as a vice-presidential candidate, he is held in high regard in Islamist circles and would shield Jokowi from attack on Islamic issues.

Opinion polling shows that Ma’ruf’s nomination has slightly reduced Jokowi’s electability, but it has increased the president’s Islamic support. Overall, support for Jokowi and Ma’ruf is almost double that of Prabowo and Sandiaga.

While the selection of Ma’ruf is not without its advantages, Jokowi’s handling of the nomination process exposes a certain lack of political nerve and a sense of susceptibility to coalition demands. If, as appears likely, Jokowi is elected in April 2019, his willingness to buckle to pressure over the past month will undermine his authority and embolden coalition parties in championing their own interests.


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Jokowi sworn in to tackle a divided Indonesian government

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Indonesia’s president-elect Joko Widodo, popularly known as Jokowi, will be sworn into office today in a divisive political environment.

Jokowi, who won 53.15% of the votes in the presidential election, will have to work with a parliament controlled by the opposing coalition. Defeated candidate Prabowo Subianto’s Red-and-White coalition holds 292 seats. Parties supporting Jokowi hold 207 seats.

On Friday, Jokowi met with Prabowo after months of political tension. Prabowo stated that his party should now support the new president. He also said that he would remain critical if the government went against the people’s aspiration.

The meeting does not ensure Prabowo’s coalition will go along with the Jokowi government. Although Prabowo did not say it openly, being critical could still also mean being obstructive to Jokowi’s reform plans.

Divided government

Indonesia’s current political landscape, in which different political parties or different coalitions of parties control different branches of government, is generally referred to as “divided government”.

A divided government is nothing new. It happens in developing as well as in developed countries.

It happened in Ecuador after the military regime in 1979 as well as in Mexico between 1997 and 2000. Germany and the United States also have divided governments.

At times, a divided government can result in better checks and balances. Members of parliament could seriously discuss public policy proposed by the president and all arguments are openly verified.

During the first term of the Clinton administration in the US, when there was a unified government, the US budget ran into deficit. In the second Clinton administration, when the Democrats controlled the presidency and Republicans controlled the Congress, policies were changed and the US budget enjoyed surpluses.

However, a divided government may also lead to protracted bickering among politicians. The political tug-of-war between the executive and legislative can turn into zero-sum games, with the people being the ultimate losers.

The road for Indonesia

Indonesia has a critical and hefty policy agenda for the next five years. Jokowi’s success in manoeuvring through Indonesia’s political landscape will be fundamental to progress for two reasons.

First, it could determine in what form democracy survives in Indonesia. Jokowi is the first president to come from outside the circle of Indonesian political elites; he won by sheer weight of support from the people. Old political elites, the New Order oligarchy figures and even the military seem to be ready to seize the opportunity if Jokowi fails to deliver.

Second, Jokowi’s success or failure in managing the political numbers will determine whether he can deliver his public policy agenda. People expect Jokowi to make policy breakthroughs, something that rarely happened during the decade-long Yudhoyono presidency. However, the political challenge is greater for Jokowi, as he won with only 53% of the popular vote compared to Yudhoyono’s 62%.

Jokowi needs to cut the fuel subsidy that is eating almost one-fifth of the state budget. He needs to deal with a current account deficit, rupiah depreciation and issues of competitiveness in international trade as the new ASEAN Economic Community approaches next year. He also needs to reform the bureaucracy and combat corruption.

Within the parliament, Jokowi’s Great Indonesia coalition has already lost five consecutive battles against the Red-and-White coalition. Most notably, the Red-and-White coalition succeeded in eliminating direct elections for local leaders. Although Yudhoyono hastily annulled this law in apparent response to the public criticism, the future of democracy at the local level remains unclear.

Prabowo’s brother, billionaire Hashim Djojohadikusumo, has openly threatened to disrupt Jokowi’s administration through the House of Representatives.

Prabowo’s Red-and-White coalition, which holds a parliamentary majority, may disrupt Jokowi’s presidency.
EPA/Bagus Indahono

The political literature suggests the president has a number of options to survive a divided government. First, a “go it alone” course of action: the president continues with his ideology and programs without parliamentary consent. Second, “go public”: the president involves the public in the policy-making process to gain popular support. Third, “bargain within the beltway”: the president negotiates and makes compromises with the parliament.

Friday’s meeting shows that Jokowi is open to a persuasive approach when dealing with political opponents. He certainly needs more of this approach in five years to come.

Jokowi holds some cards

Jokowi actually has a lot of political means at his disposal. His relatively untainted reputation is a good start to deal with members of parliament with records of alleged corruption.

House of Representatives Speaker Setya Novanto, for example, has been implicated in a number of graft cases recorded by the KPK (Corruption Eradication Commission). The KPK has also investigated the newly elected People’s Consultative Assembly chair, former forestry ministry Zulkifli Hasan, for allegedly turning a protected forest into a commercial project.

There are also various records of human right abuses, tax avoidance and alleged corruption among the parliamentary members that Jokowi could use politically to claw back against his opponents.

The essence of democracy is to deliver promises for the people. Jokowi and members of parliament should keep in mind that their actions will have an impact on the lives of ordinary Indonesians.


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Can Jokowi Bring Peace to West Papua?

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Separatist resistance persists in Indonesia’s West Papua region, as attempts to internationalize the dispute by the Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka – OPM) make it necessary for Jakarta to devise new policy options to address the decades-old conflict.

OPM has been waging a low-level guerrilla war in West Papua, formerly known as Irian Jaya, since 1969, the year of the controversial Act of Free Choice – a referendum process that ostensibly resulted in a unanimous decision by Papuan representatives to accept Indonesian sovereignty, but which has been dismissed by analysts as fraudulent.

Police reports indicate that between 2009 and 2014, there were 166 cases of violence involving the OPM. There were at least 14 attacks on the security apparatus in the region between 2014 and 2015. These actions indicate that despite the efforts of a newly democratic Indonesia (since 1998) to proactively address these challenges by reforming its counterinsurgency approach and providing more welfare for the population, grievances fed by protracted human rights abuses and economic exploitation linger.

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The violence has been accompanied by OPM efforts to rally support from state and non state actors overseas, especially outreach to Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) members such as Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, and Fiji. With the help of these countries, the issues of independence and human rights abuses have been raised at the UN General Assembly, a development that could have serious repercussions for Indonesia’s international image.

The impoverished economic conditions of native Papuans is not the only factor driving the growing violence. Unsound transmigration practices have created a demographic imbalance where urban areas are inhabited mainly by non-Papuans while native Papuans populate the rural areas. Tensions are ever-present due to historical memories and the legacy of cruel military conduct, such as the infamous Biak Massacre of 1998, the perpetrators of which remain at large.

Aiming to address such grievances, Indonesian President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo has pledged to visit Papua three times a year, with one such visit being made in early May. Jokowi travelled to several areas, initiating economic projects like the national tourism region (Kawasan Strategis Pariwisata Nasional – KSPN) in Sorong and a petrochemical industry in Manokwari. In Merauke he harvested rice with the military, symbolically signifying his intention to strengthen the territorial functions of the military through welfare-related strategies aimed at building links to local Papuans.

A Three-Pronged Approach

More importantly, Jokowi stopped by a pasar mama-mama, a traditional market comprising women from traditional highland tribes, doing his trademark blusukan, or dialogue, with the local inhabitants and expressing a desire to resume the long-stalled Jakarta-Papua dialogue. While a mostly symbolic gesture, Jokowi’s visit aims to highlight his determination to win the hearts of Papuans through a three-pronged strategy of welfare, security, and dialogue.

With 45 percent of national copper reserves, 41 million hectares of productive forest, and 8 million hectares of conservation forest located in the region, Indonesia is clearly prepared to take extreme measures to prevent a repetition of the 1999 East Timor separation. Indonesia also sees the West Papua region – which consists of two provinces, Papua and West Papua – as a strategic buffer against potential intrusions from the north and east, such as those involving illegal fishing boats. The loss of Papua would reverberate across the archipelago with repercussions for fragile areas like Aceh, Maluku, and Kalimantan.

Jokowi remains aware that the stubborn resistance not only reflects the economic straits of native Papuans, but also the still unresolved military abuses in the era prior to Indonesia’s 1998 democratic transition.

Consequently, Jokowi aims to beef up former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s welfare and security approaches in the two troubled provinces. More importantly, though, he seeks to reinvent one element that could be a determining factor: dialogue.

To address welfare issues, Jokowi will adopt a more nuanced economic strategy. In the past, development polices actually worsened conditions, while poorly conceived transmigration policies during the New Order exacerbated conflict between trans-migrants and native Papuans. Hence, Jokowi’s development strategy consists of several new features, encompassing not just infrastructure expansion to achieve a low-cost economy, but also a local economy based on fairness and proportionality. To achieve a low-cost economy, Jokowi’s Ocean Toll Road project will be pioneered in Sorong, Jayapura, and Merauke. Deep-sea port facilities, once installed, should reduce transaction costs for far flung regions like Papua. The Indonesian president seeks to promote connectivity by revitalizing Frans Kaisepo as the international airport in Biak, building a trans-Papuan train system, constructing a bridge in Holtekamp, Jayapura, and accelerating infrastructure development in isolated areas.

In terms of regional development, fairness and proportionality remain contentious issues. To meet the needs of remote provinces, Jokowi has spoken of his intention to accelerate the provision of basic infrastructure, rehabilitate traditional markets, renegotiate the sharing of resources between Papua and Jakarta, and implement a “special autonomy plus” concept that would lead to a revision of the 2001 special autonomy law.

To ensure the success of his initiatives, Jokowi understands that he must do more to regain trust. Previous governments have failed to acknowledge that simply addressing economic issues was not enough: A comprehensive solution was needed. Indifference toward the political, ideological, and historical nuances of the conflict sowed the seeds of deep distrust, making it difficult for Papuans to move forward and forgive.

So Jokowi has pledged a dialogue that aims at comprehensively addressing issues beyond underdevelopment, involving the leaders of OPM. He is also encouraging every element at all levels of government – military district commander, the police chief, and all civil elements – to intensify dialogue with local inhabitants. In April, the Indonesian government offered a public undertaking to set up a team to investigate past human rights violations. The team consists of officials from the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Supreme Court, police, State Intelligence Agency, armed forces, and the Human Rights Commission. Its success will be the determining factor in the government’s effort to regain the trust essential for negotiating peace in West Papua.

Jokowi has also sought to win the trust of an international audience, especially MSG member states, which remain pessimistic of Indonesia’s ability to peacefully address its Papuan problems. West Papua’s application for membership to the MSG was submitted last year by the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), and was followed this year by a similar application lodged by the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL). The applications are currently under consideration. Jakarta worries that if West Papua’s bid is successful it would have deleterious consequences for Indonesia’s international image in forums like the UN.

As a counter move, Jokowi made overtures to Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O’Neil during a May visit, expressing his willingness to build strong ties with the PNG, the MSG, and the broader Pacific region. To neutralize the impact of West Papua’s membership application, Indonesia has lodged its own application for membership of the MSG. Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi has visited Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and Fiji, hoping to persuade these Pacific Island states to reconsider West Papua’s membership bid. If Jakarta’s own membership application is accepted, it will not only allow the Melanesian provinces of Indonesia to participate in cultural, trade, and investment engagements under Indonesia’s representation; it will also dilute any diplomatic support MSG member states offer the West Papua independence movement. Jokowi has also sought to appeal to the wider international community by granting clemency to five political prisoners while also ending the decades-long restrictions on international media access to Papua.

Old Wine, New Bottle?

Despite these seemingly genuine efforts by Jokowi, widely seen as a people’s president who started out as a small-time furniture entrepreneur in Solo, his concurrent plans to increase the military’s presence in the region have encouraged skepticism. Certainly, Jokowi is calling for a softer security approach, called Bhakti Bina Keamanan dan Ketertiban MasyarakatBhabinkamtibmas, essentially a social empowerment program under the auspices of the regional police, together with an unfortunately worded serbuan teritorial or “territorial invasion” program of social empowerment led by the regional military. Still, the local military presence is estimated at 45,000 troops presently deployed in Papua plus an additional 650 soldiers stationed near the PNG border. And with a further expansion of the military’s territorial structure, including the addition of a military district command (Kodam) in Manokwari plus a new Eastern Central Fleet based in Sorong that will add an estimated 7000-10,000 personnel, along with a plan to form a third division of the Army Strategic Command and a new Air Force Command; West Papua will become one of the most heavily militarized regions in Indonesia.

Various community projects aimed at empowering the locals are set to be conducted under the leadership of the military regional command (Kodam) and the police regional command (Polda), in cooperation with local government, state agencies, and ethnic leaders. Although the social empowerment programs are meant to build links and improve the image of the security apparatus, the specter of past human rights violations – extrajudicial executions, arbitrary detentions, and torture among them – gives rise to doubts whether the new military strategy will succeed in rebuilding local confidence in the security apparatus or whether it will in fact be perceived as a return to Suharto’s authoritarian methods.

One potential fault line that will require special attention is the lack of appreciation of the inherent complexities of Papuan cultures. More than 300 tribes exist in Papua from a total indigenous population base of fewer than 1.5 million people, with their own subtribes, clans, and subclans. With such a complex cultural milieu, there is always a risk of misperception and cultural incomprehension leading to military abuse. Prior to the 2005 peace accords, military abuse in Aceh was the product of an inability of the military to understand local customs and languages. Many Acehnese suffered violent treatment at the hands of the military because they could not communicate in Bahasa Indonesia (the Indonesian language).

Indonesian security forces, learning the lessons of Aceh, have anticipated such problems by recruiting more locals. For example, the police force has initiated a program called Brigadir Putra Daerah, or Local Youth Brigade, collaborating with local government since 2008 to recruit more than 1500 Papuans. Similarly, the military has attempted to recruit Babinsa or local village NCOs from among the Papuan population.

Yet while the intentions are good, the concept remains flawed. “Territorial invasion” is still driven by a perception of “local inability” rather than “local partnership” and a condescending attitude borne of years of ingrained prejudice that the locals are backward or “Papua Bodoh.” With such ensconced attitudes, a social empowerment program – even one based on a sound rationale – can descend into a situation where those running the program resort to intimidation to deal with short-term pressures. Real success requires that cultural training and language skills be prioritized to stop ethnocentrism and stereotyping from undermining the ability to address the deeper problems of Papuan underdevelopment.

Normalizing Tensions

Jokowi’s initiatives face some serious challenges, particularly the need to build an effective “dialogue” leg. A fragmented rebellion has complicated efforts to maintain a dialogue. According to a 2015 Threat Perception Report produced by the Papua Police Regional Command, seven groups recognized as armed separatists have declared themselves to be the legitimate OPM representative. Each group is supported by and cooperates with several smaller groups. For instance, Goliath Tabuni, a group with its operations based in the Tingginambut region of Puncak Jaya, controls the activities of groups like Leo Magay Yogi in Paniai, Ayub Waker in Tembagapura, and Theny Kwalik in Timika. Or there is Hans Uri Yuweni, a group based in Jayapura, which has a pervasive influence in parts of West Papua province such as Sorong and Manokwari reaching all the way down to Merauke in the Papua province. It is unlikely that a successful dialogue with one group will necessarily be supported by the others. Consequently, the risk of spoilers derailing the talks is high and will affect the sustainability of any peace process. From Jakarta, the risks presented by hardline groups from within the military or parliament are also high. Hence, the ability to manage different interest groups and the high expectations of Papuan groups will be vital in finding a durable solution to the conflict.

Jokowi is well regarded for his ability to negotiate, communicate with ordinary people, and blend. This was evident, for instance, when he peacefully relocated hawkers in Solo and Jakarta, while in the process working out an acceptable compensation package. Negotiating for peace in Papua will be fraught with uncertainly. Talks during the Aceh peace process required Yudhoyono to use skills learned during Suharto-era military politics to manage spoiler elements from the military and parliament, Jusuf Kalla and third-party mediators willing to engage the Free Aceh Movement, and the urgency revolving around the need for post-tsunami reconstruction.

Jokowi must adopt a “hands on approach” if he is to successfully find a resolution to the Papuan conflict. To reduce negative perceptions of the military, he needs to supervise its activities closely and ensure that their conduct towards the local population reflects greater cultural awareness. Jokowi also needs to live up to his promise to address local grievances with dialogue, while being creative in finding a solution that takes into consideration sensitive issues like the political aspirations of the Papuan people. Perhaps most importantly, rather than simply imposing its ideas, Jakarta really needs to begin to listen.

Leonard C. Sebastian is Associate Professor and Coordinator of the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU). Emirza Adi Syailendra is a Research Analyst at the Indonesia Programme at the S. Rajaratnam of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU).


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Mivo TV MNC Net Kompas RCTI ANTV SCTV Indosiar Online Streaming

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Mivo TV adalah sebuah portal situs televisi paling populer, dengan beragam aneka program acara terkini di Indonesia, seputar hiburan dan berita dihadirkan untuk menemani anda sekeluarga di rumah dengan saluran tv yang ditayangkan.

Channel situs www.mivo.com menyiarkan siaran televisi lokal dan mancanegara, dengan kategori di bidang berita, musik, sport dan sepakbola.

Layanan ini bisa dinikmati oleh para pemirsa dengan cara menghubungkan laptop, pc ataupun smartphone ke dalam koneksi internet, dan diharuskan memiliki layanan koneksi dengan mempunyai kecepatan yang sangat stabil.

Mivo TV Online Live Streaming Indonesia

Dan akan lebih baik jika memiliki kecepatan koneksi tingkat tinggi, untuk bisa menayangkan siaran mivo tv yang sedang ditayangkan saat ini.

Dengan adanya layanan channel pada situs mivo.tv Indonesia terlengkap secara gratis ini, maka anda bisa nonton siaran televisi online dengan kualitas tinggi HD tanpa buffering cepat terbaik.

Dengan meliputi siaran langsung Mivo TV, RCTI, SCTV, MNC TV, Global TV, ANTV, Indosiar, Trans7, Trans TV, TV One, MNC Sport, Net TV, Bein Sport, TVRI, dan Metro TV.

MIVO tv online menyajikan siaran tv secara eksklusif yang khusus buat para pemirsa di rumah, yang ingin menikmati siaran televisi secara online via internet.

Dengan aneka jadwal tayangan streaming bola yang sangat menghibur di setiap waktunya dan tentunya dengan program acara unggulan jadwal mivo tv online indonesia terkini malam hari ini.


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SEPAKBOLA.com (@sepakbola) | Twitter

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Hasil Pertandingan Sepakbola Tgl 16 – 17 January 2019

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By Angelice Onggi – Kamis, Januari 17, 2019

Hasil Pertandingan Piala FA Inggris, Piala Italia, Piala Raja Spanyol, Liga Prancis, Piala Portugal, Piala AFC Asia 2019, Club Friendly, Piala Turki, Piala Siprus, Piala Israel, Piala Torneos de Verano Argentina, Piala Meksiko, Liga Kosta Rika, Liga Jamaika, Liga Australia, Liga Kenya, Liga Afrika Selatan, Liga Tunisia, Liga Nigeria, International Friendly U19.

Hasil Pertandingan Sepakbola Tgl 16 - 17 January 2019

Agen Bola ~ Hasil Pertandingan Sepakbola Tgl 16 – 17 January 2019

England – FA Cup ;

AET Southampton 2 – 2 Derby County *

Italy – Serie C:: group C ;

FT Viterbese 1 – 1 Reggina

Italy – Super Cup ;

FT Juventus 1 – 0 AC Milan

Spain – Copa del Rey ;

FT Atletico Madrid 3 – 3 GironaFT Sevilla 0 – 1 Athletic BilbaoFT Leganes 1 – 0 Real Madrid

France – Ligue 1 ;

FT AS Monaco 1 – 1 NiceFT Guingamp 2 – 1 RennesFT Toulouse 2 – 2 LyonFT Nimes 1 – 0 NantesFT Saint-Etienne 2 – 1 Marseille

France – Cup ;

AET Grenoble 0 – 1 Strasbourg

Portugal – Segunda Liga ;

FT Benfica B 4 – 0 Academico Viseu

Portugal – Cup ;

FT Feirense 0 – 2 Sporting CP

Asian Cup – Group C ;

FT Kyrgyzstan 3 – 1 PhilippinesFT South Korea 2 – 0 China

Asian Cup – Group D ;

FT Iran 0 – 0 IraqFT Vietnam 2 – 0 Yemen

International – Club Friendlies ;

FT Spartak Moscow 5 – 2 Lokomotiv TashkentFT AC Horsens 3 – 1 FredericiaFT Vejle Boldklub 1 – 0 Mezokovesd SEFT Austria Wien 0 – 1 Wiener NeustadtFT Sion 3 – 0 Dinamo BucurestiFT Portimonense 1 – 1 MSV DuisburgFT SC Furstenfeld 1 – 6 Hartberg

Turkey – Cup ;

FT Yeni Malatyaspor 3 – 2 Bodrum Belediyesi BodrumsporFT Istanbul Basaksehir 1 – 0 HataysporFT Trabzonspor 2 – 1 Balikesirspor

Cyprus – Cup ;

FT Anorthosis 2 – 3 Enosis ParalimniFT Omonia Nicosia 1 – 1 Apollon LimassolFT Aris Limassol 2 – 1 Pafos FCFT Asil Lysi 0 – 4 Ermis AradippouFT Nea Salamis 1 – 2 AEK Larnaca

Israel – Cup ;

FT Bnei Yehuda Tel Aviv FC 2 – 0 Hapoel Nazareth Illit FC

Argentina – Torneos de Verano ;

FT River Plate 1 – 0 NacionalFT Boca Juniors 0 – 2 Union

Mexico – Copa MX:: clausura group 1 ;

FT Xolos de Tijuana 1 – 1 Atlante FC

Mexico – Copa MX:: clausura group 3 ;

FT Queretaro FC 1 – 3 Dorados

Mexico – Copa MX:: clausura group 5 ;

FT Cruz Azul 2 – 3 Club Leon

Mexico – Copa MX:: clausura group 7 ;

FT Mineros de Zacatecas 2 – 0 Tiburones Rojos de Veracruz

Mexico – Copa MX:: clausura group 8 ;

FT CD Guadalajara 3 – 0 CF Cafetaleros de Tapachula

Costa Rica – Primera División:: clausura ;

FT Deportiva San Carlos 0 – 0 Guadalupe FCFT Limon 2 – 1 AD Santos De Guapiles

Jamaica – Premier League ;

FT Dunbeholden Fc 0 – 2 Mount Pleasant FcFT Portmore United FC 1 – 0 Montego Bay UnitedFT Harbour View FC 0 – 2 Cavalier FC

Australia – Hyundai A-League ;

FT Central Coast Mariners FC 2 – 1 Melbourne City FC

Kenya – Premier League ;

FT Gor Mahia 4 – 1 MT Kenya United

South Africa – Premier League ;

FT Amazulu Durban 2 – 3 Kaizer Chiefs FCFT Cape Town City FC 5 – 0 Free State StarsFT Mamelodi Sundowns FC 1 – 0 Maritzburg United

Tunisia – Ligue I ;

FT AS Gabes 1 – 2 Club Sportif Sfaxien

Nigeria – NPFL:: group A ;

Postp. Bendel Insurance ? – ? EnyimbaPostp. Enugu Rangers ? – ? Katsina UnitedFT MFM FC 2 – 0 Kwara UnitedFT Niger Tornadoes 1 – 1 Rivers United FCPostp. Remo Stars ? – ? Wikki TouristPostp. Sunshine Stars ? – ? Lobi Stars

Nigeria – NPFL:: group B ;

FT Abia Warriors 1 – 2 Go RoundPostp. Gombe United ? – ? Akwa UnitedFT Heartland Owerri 3 – 0 Plateau UnitedFT Ifeanyi Ubah United 1 – 0 Nasarawa UnitedPostp. Kada City ? – ? Yobe Desert Stars

International – Friendly (Under 19) ;

FT Italy U19 3 – 0 Spain U19

Happy Betting , semoga hari ini hari keberuntungan anda..=D/

Selamat Beraktivitas , Have a Nice Day..

==============================================================
Salam Olahraga :




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Kumpulan Berita Presiden Jokowi Terbaru

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  • Setelah Diperiksa Polisi, Penyebar Hoaks Ijazah Jokowi Tak Ditahan

    Setelah Diperiksa Polisi, Penyebar Hoaks Ijazah Jokowi Tak Ditahan

    Sabtu, 19 Januari 2019 – 19:10 WIB

    Umar Kholid Harahap (28) diciduk polisi di Bekasi, Jawa Barat, karena diduga menjadi penyebar berita bohong atau hoaks soal ijazah Presiden Jokowi palsu.

  • Jokowi Hadiri Gerakan Mengawal Musim Tanam di Garut

    Jokowi Hadiri Gerakan Mengawal Musim Tanam di Garut

    Sabtu, 19 Januari 2019 – 14:13 WIB

    Presiden Jokowi didampingi Ibu Negara Iriana melaksanakan kunjungan kerja di Kampung Kaum Luwuk (Blok Pesawahan), Desa/Kecamatan Leuwigoong, Garut, Jabar.

  • Bertemu Warga Garut, Jokowi Didoakan Menang Pilpres

    Bertemu Warga Garut, Jokowi Didoakan Menang Pilpres

    Jum’at, 18 Januari 2019 – 18:21 WIB

    Ada peristiwa menarik dalam kunjungan di Garut. Ketika itu ada beberapa warga, khususnya ibu-ibu yang tidak menduga kedatangan Jokowi.

  • Setelah Debat, Paginya Jokowi Langsung Kunker ke Jawa Barat

    Setelah Debat, Paginya Jokowi Langsung Kunker ke Jawa Barat

    Jum’at, 18 Januari 2019 – 14:03 WIB

    Tiba di Lanud Husein Sastranegara, mantan Wali Kota Solo ini langsung menuju ke Stasiun Kereta Api Bandung untuk melanjutkan perjalanan ke Cibatu, Kabupaten Garut.

  • Tingkat Kepuasan terhadap Kinerja Jokowi di Atas 70%

    Tingkat Kepuasan terhadap Kinerja Jokowi di Atas 70%

    Selasa, 15 Januari 2019 – 12:26 WIB

    Kepuasan publik terhadap pemerintahan Joko Widodo-Jusuf Kalla (JK) cukup tinggi. Hasil survei yang dirilis Y-Publica, tingkat kepuasan publik sebesar 70,3%.

  • Hadiri Silaturahmi PBNW, TGB Zainul Majdi Ungkap Sosok Jokowi

    Hadiri Silaturahmi PBNW, TGB Zainul Majdi Ungkap Sosok Jokowi

    Senin, 14 Januari 2019 – 14:58 WIB

    Mantan Gubernur NTB, Tuan Guru Bajang Muhammad Zainul Majdi mengungkapkan pandangannya terhadap sosok Jokowi, termasuk isu-isu yang memfitnah calon presiden petahana itu.

  • Pengemudi Ojek Online Ucapkan Terima Kasih ke Jokowi

    Pengemudi Ojek Online Ucapkan Terima Kasih ke Jokowi

    Minggu, 13 Januari 2019 – 10:22 WIB

    Seorang perwakilan pengemudi transportasi online mengucapkan terima kasih kepada pemerintah mengenai lapangan pekerjaan di bidang transportasi online.

  • Presiden Jokowi Utus Moeldoko ke Situjuah

    Presiden Jokowi Utus Moeldoko ke Situjuah

    Sabtu, 12 Januari 2019 – 23:14 WIB

    Presiden Joko Widodo mengutus Kepala Staf Kepresidenan Jendral TNI (purn) Moeldoko, untuk menghadiri sekaligus menjadi inspektur upacara paling dramatis di Ranah Minang, tragedi 15 Januari 1949.

  • Program Bagi-Bagi Sertifikat Dinilai Bukti Komitmen Pemerataan Ekonomi

    Program Bagi-Bagi Sertifikat Dinilai Bukti Komitmen Pemerataan Ekonomi

    Kamis, 10 Januari 2019 – 16:03 WIB

    Anggota TKN Jokowi-Ma’ruf Amin, Dedek Prayudi mengapresiasi kepada Presiden Jokowi yang baru saja membagikan 3.000 sertifikat tanah di Jakarta Barat, Rabu (10/1/2019).

  • Jokowi Bakal Tingkatkan Keamanan Pasca Teror Bom di KPK

    Jokowi Bakal Tingkatkan Keamanan Pasca Teror Bom di KPK

    Kamis, 10 Januari 2019 – 11:39 WIB

    Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi) mengatakan akan meningkatkan keamanan dan keselamatan kepada para pejabat Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK).

  • Dua Pimpinan KPK Diteror, Jokowi: Kita Cari dan Kejar Pelakunya

    Dua Pimpinan KPK Diteror, Jokowi: Kita Cari dan Kejar Pelakunya

    Kamis, 10 Januari 2019 – 10:59 WIB

    Rumah dua pimpinan Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK) Agus Rahardjo dan Laode Muhammad Syarif dilempari benda mirip bom molotov, Rabu (9/1/2019) pagi.

  • Diskriminasi Ulama dan Pemuka Agama Picu Perlawanan Umat

    Diskriminasi Ulama dan Pemuka Agama Picu Perlawanan Umat

    Kamis, 10 Januari 2019 – 00:53 WIB

    Pola kepemimpinan dan sikap politik Presiden Joko Widodo (Jokowi) jelang Pilpres 2019 banyak menuai kritikan pedas dari berbagai kalangan khususnya para ulama dan pemuka agama.

  • Jokowi Targetkan Akhir Tahun Ini Seluruh Tanah Jakarta Bersertifikat

    Jokowi Targetkan Akhir Tahun Ini Seluruh Tanah Jakarta Bersertifikat

    Rabu, 09 Januari 2019 – 16:56 WIB

    Dari hasil blusukan selama ini, Jokowi melihat banyak sengketa tanah terjadi di sejumlah provinsi.

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jokowi

With a Dozen Economic Reform Packages under His Belt, Indonesia’s Jokowi Settles In

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May 26, 2016

Last September, almost a year after taking office, President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo released his first installment of policy packages intended to stimulate the Indonesian economy. Focused on improving industrial competitiveness through reducing red tape, the reform package removed 89 business investment regulations and eased the acquisition of licenses, land, and bank accounts.

He has released 11 additional packages—one or more each month—since then, the last of which was announced on April 28. Another is expected soon, with word that his ministers are reviewing a draft that focuses on sector-specific changes. The packages emphasize deregulation, tax incentives, elimination of redundancies, predictability, and harmonization (customs at ports, land use, and currency for payments).

In short, Jokowi is trying, step-by-step, to live up to his pledge of making it easier to do business in Indonesia. The World Bank ranks Indonesia 109th for ease of doing business, behind regional neighbors such as Singapore (1st), Malaysia (18th), Thailand (49th), Vietnam (90th), and the Philippines (103rd). Jokowi wanted that number to be in the 40s by the end of his term, but suggested he could live with improvement to the 60s or 70s in the coming years.

The reforms reflect Jokowi’s mindset: they are practical and focused on concrete steps. But while the spirit of the reforms is in line with accepted practices for improving ease of doing business, implementation of such an ambitious program in a country focused on decentralization and empowerment of local officials is a fair test for Jokowi’s prowess as a politician and president. The13th package, in fact, is expected to address procedures at the regional level.

Jokowi has pledged to eliminate 3,000 regional government regulations by July (he has identified 42,000 regulations in need of elimination or change at the central government level), arguing they hamper the setting up and operation of businesses. Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs Darmin Nasution reported 94.5 percent of the policy packages have already been implemented. Releasing data to support this claim would be welcomed by Indonesia’s economic partners.

In a May 19 opinion article in Kompas questioning the effectiveness of Jokowi’s economic reform packages, Indonesian economist and former chairman of the State Audit Agency Anwar Nasution noted that the Central Bureau of Statistics reported slowed economic growth and stagnant achievements in investment and exports in the first quarter of the year. Indeed, Indonesia’s economy grew less than expected in the first quarter at 4.92 percent, down from analysts’ expectation of 5.07 percent.

But should we expect the results of reforms begun last September to be evident in first-quarter numbers for 2016? Or is the improvement of the investment environment a process that takes more time to bear fruit?

Often described as “a gold mine in a minefield” by foreign investors, Indonesia is a country with enormous potential but one that is also an extremely difficult place for foreign companies to operate. Surely it will take longer than a handful of months to change that reality and perception, even if the best laws are on the books. The expectation of instantaneous results has been an unwelcome and frequent feature of Jokowi’s presidency; many public evaluations of his performance thus far have been dismissive of the time required for real change at the national level.

When he assumed office in October 2014, Jokowi faced high expectations deriving from his unprecedented story. A former furniture dealer who became mayor of Surakarta (Solo) and then governor of Jakarta, Jokowi defeated Prabowo Subianto—scion of the establishment—to become the first Indonesian president elected from outside the political or military elite. His election was seen as a rebuke of the old ways, including endemic corruption, giving Jokowi an opportunity for clean governance and a fresh start.

But soon enough, the chatter began that the president was in over his head. He nominated too many political appointees versus technocrats, he stumbled by sticking with graft suspect Budi Gunawan for chief of the national police, and he equivocated when the same police went after the Corruption Eradication Commission in response. He wasn’t even the most influential member of his own political party; that would be Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former president herself.

As Jokowi moves through the second year of his presidency, he seems to have regained his footing, and recent events have strengthened his position. At the Golkar party’s congress in Bali in mid-May, newly elected chairman Setya Novanto formally announced his party would leave the opposition Red and White Coalition, helmed by Prabowo, to support Jokowi’s coalition. The addition of Golkar, Indonesia’s second-largest political party, gives the president’s coalition control of 62 percent of Parliament, representing a shift in the balance of power that should allow Jokowi to push through more of his agenda.

Plans to reform Indonesia’s negative investment list—the regulation listing sectors closed off to foreign investment—were announced in February. The revamped list, signed and made public in late May, shows sectors including toll roads, waste management, restaurants, and cinemas will be 100 percent open for foreign ownership. Meanwhile, investments in e-commerce under $7 million will be subject to a 49 percent foreign ownership cap. The clarity the list provides and the expected increased openness should help. Jokowi has also made more efforts to consult the business community during the law-making process than his predecessors did.

A second cabinet reshuffle, too, could solidify Jokowi’s economic reforms—rumors have circulated in Jakarta for months that such a move is imminent. The first such reshuffle took place last August, introduced numerous reform-oriented technocrats, and preceded the release of the first economic reform package. The recent addition of Golkar to the president’s coalition may hasten the reshuffle, with increased pressure to bring new members of the coalition into the cabinet. There is some risk—will reform-minded ministers who are looking to move beyond a commodity-based economy remain in place and be given the time and space to complete their mission? Or will political pressure and entrenched interests win out? Let’s hope Jokowi will give his ministers the same space he should be afforded to execute his reform agenda.

(This Commentary originally appeared in the May 26, 2016, issue of Southeast Asia from Scott Circle .)

Shannon Hayden is associate director of the CSIS Southeast Asia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).

© 2016 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.


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